CONFLICT ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE COST FOR DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA

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Abstract
This article interrogates the acts and activities of promoters and profiteers of violent conflicts and how such activities affect development processes in Nigeria. Academic debates on the causes and impacts of violent conflicts have generated divergent stimulating discourses in explaining why violence erupts and how they affect development. Most often, there are consensus among these studies that actors in conflict environments make maximum efforts to prevent further bloodshed. Yet, some nuanced studies view some of the actors in conflict environments as entrepreneurs who act both as economic and political actors by stimulating and escalating violence as way for attaining economic and political power. As such, it became crucial to interrogate conflict as a career – how conflict generation, sustenance and escalation offer status, influence and money and how this in turn undermines development in Nigeria relying on the integration of various secondary sources, political-economy approach and the greed and grievance theory.

Keywords: Development, Political Economy violence, Conflict, Entrepreneurship, Greed and Grievance.

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Introduction

This article interrogates the acts and activities of promoters and profiteers of violent conflicts and how such activities have stunted development processes in Nigeria. It explores the costs – in terms of human and economic costs – of violence for development. Academic debates on the causes and impacts of violent conflicts have generated divergent stimulating discourses in explaining why violence erupts and how such violent conflicts have affected development – social, cultural, political and economic – in the environments they occur (Collier, 1998). Most often, there are consensus among some of these studies that actors in conflict environments make maximum efforts to prevent further bloodshed. Yet, some nuanced studies view some of the actors in conflict environments as entrepreneurs who act both as economic and political actors by stimulating and escalating violence as way for attaining economic and political power (Uhunmwwangho, 2011). As such, it is crucial to engage the causes of conflicts and the continuous devastating impacts they have induced in societies. In this connection, this article interrogates conflict as a career – how conflict generation, sustenance and escalation offer status, influence and money and how this in turn undermines development in Nigeria.

Charles Tilly compared the actions of state and war making which he claims serve the same purpose, representing organised crime at its smoothest. Tilly’s analyses indicate that “European experience of the past few centuries present a portrait of war makers and state makers as coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs which bears a far greater resemblance than do its chief alternatives” (1985:169). This implies that consciously creating violent conflicts for the purposes of gain making at the expense of society is not new to human history. What is germane is that these entrepreneurs are coercive and self-seeking in their methodology. As such, the entrepreneurs often mobilise individuals
through various means to achieve their goals. They appeal to religious, ideological and/or ethnic solidarity; patronage system and promises of security whether real or imagined. However, there is a paucity of literature interrogating this phenomenon.

Nonetheless, since the end of the Second World War, there has been 250 wars worldwide which is equivalent to 4 wars per year (Roche, 2003). These wars have come with heavy price tag both in economic and human cost, though every war or conflict has a different and unique cost. For instance, a recent most documented war – the US war on terror in Iraqi and Afghanistan following the 9/11 terror attacks witnessed around 347,539 casualties between 2001 and 2014 and over three trillion US dollars spent to execute these wars by the United States Government (Youtube documentary, 2016; Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2008; Washington Post, 2005).

Consequently, the world’s resources are sunk into arms purchases and peace support operations – an initiative for development that has often not been successful especially in Africa. World leaders at the UN millennium summit in 2000 pledged to cut poverty by half in 2015; hence the UN requested $50 billion per year to achieve this set goal. This was not achieved even though world governments have gone ahead with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in attempt to address inequality – one of the remote causes of violent conflict. Despite this inability to pay for development, different governments have spent more than $10 Trillion on armaments since 1990 (Roche,2003). To this end, the cost of violent conflicts, arms acquisitions and production since the 20th century if calculated into figures will be far incomprehensible. As such, it becomes crucial to interrogate factors facilitating violence and the consequent cost for development.
In Africa, it is estimated that the continent has suffered a combined loss of around 300 billion US dollars since 1990 to violent conflicts and wars (Suifon, 2012). The International Action Network on Small Arms, Safeworld and Oxfam International, claimed that between 1990 and 2005, armed conflict cost Africa 18 billion US dollars, a situation which saw 23 African countries experience different kinds of violent conflicts (Alimba, 2014). Consequently, the World Bank claims that resources diverted by conflict away from development use are estimated at one billion dollars a year in central Africa and more than eight hundred million dollars in West Africa.

In Nigeria, apart from the unprecedented number of human fatalities induced by various forms of conflict and insecurity since 1999 (Nigeria Watch, 2017; Taft and Haken, 2015), there is an outrageous economic cost (Ikejiaku, 2009) as well as over 4 million population displacements stimulated by terrorism, disasters and communal conflicts (Comolli, 2015; UNSC, 2017). Most of these conflicts have led to empty communities and destruction of social and economic infrastructures such as schools, banks, residential homes, post offices, police stations and worship centres (Ekeh, 1999; Albert, 2001; Comolli, 2015; UNSC, 2017). Yet, many individuals are continually engaging in inciting conflicts for the purposes of benefiting from their proceeds either in the short or long term. Ikelegbe (2005) contended that there is an emerging economy of conflict in Nigeria. Such conflict economy according to Ikelegbe (2005) is characterised with an intense, violent and bloody struggle for the appropriation of resources, its benefits and a thriving market for illegal trading and smuggling of arms. Rather than joining the eternal debates on the root causes of conflicts, it may be useful to interrogate the acts and activities of promoters and profiteers of violent conflicts and the cost of such activities for development processes in Nigeria.
To do this, the article raises the following questions. What are the roles of conflict entrepreneurs in generating violent conflicts in Nigeria? Is conflict entrepreneurship stimulated by greed or grievance in Nigeria? To what extent has the political-economy of conflicts affected development in Nigeria? These are the questions this article addresses. Relying on the integration of various secondary sources, political-economy approach and the greed and grievance theory, this article explores the connections between conflict entrepreneurship and the consequent cost for development in Nigeria.

Following the introduction, the first section shall articulate the concepts of conflict entrepreneurship, conflict cost and development. The second section shall examine the theory of greed and grievance as expounded by Paul Collier and other associates. This will be used to interrogate if increasing conflicts are stimulated by greed or grievance. The third section shall interrogate the political-economy of violence in Nigeria vis-à-vis the greed and grievance thesis and how it affects development. The last section shall conclude the study by drawing attention to matters arising from the article and making recommendations.

Conflict Entrepreneurship, Conflict Cost and Development

Conflict is a phenomenon that occurs in every society and relationship and refers to confrontational or reactionary attitude between individuals or groups resulting from opposite or incompatible end or means. Violent conflict is seen to have grave implications for politics and economics. This is because there are individuals who benefit – political or economic – from most violent events. There is a common practice in economics to take a behavioural and/or occupational view of entrepreneurship and an entrepreneur. The concept of entrepreneurship refers to either what an entrepreneur does, like starting or running a business firm or what s/he engages in for the purposes of making profit.
(Naude, Bruck and Verwimp 2013:2). Often, what necessitates establishing a new business is the choice of self-employment. The notion includes a part of the administrative function of making decisions for the conduct of some type of organisation. Entrepreneurship, therefore, is the creation of viable profitable and scalable firms (Carayannis, 2013). For this article, entrepreneurship is the act of creating and managing a business for earning income from the business.

To this end, conflict entrepreneurship is an economic creation with political undertone, built and sustained by political violence and such actions are rewarded with profit. Mark Pilisuk (2007:100) contended that actors who engage in illegal businesses to the detriment of states and their populations fall within this category and most often they remain free. Such illegalities are sustained through high powered networks. These actors can exist inside or outside of government. Conflict Entrepreneurship is conceived as:

Actors who use a specific situation or condition for establishing a conflict in order to gain something through the exploitation of new power relationships. The gain can be personal (economic wealth, political power) or it can be seen by the conflict entrepreneur to benefit a collective with which he identifies. Instigating a conflict can be… a prerequisite for preserving and protecting that collective against external threat (Eide, 1997).

The implication of the above is that some individuals in society view conflict as a profit-making enterprise and treats it as such. It also implies that power – economic, political, social or cultural – achieved through the means of violence and maintained by the act of violence is purely an act of conflict entrepreneurship. We need to draw attention to the fact that conflict entrepreneurs hide under the guise that they are fighting a collective and just cause which deserve the sympathy of a larger target public. This is a mere
camouflage as the main motive is to exploit the situation for personal gains of an individual or group.

This gives credence to the argument that conflict entrepreneurship is motivated by greed and most times reinforcing grievance. Conflict economies have three distinct but overlapping categories, each with a range of actors with differing interests and activities. These economies entail the workings of economic activities that sustain such conflict. Actors in this category include security operatives of the state (military, paramilitary forces, police and intelligence personnel). Others are rebel groups and domestic and foreign groups profiting from the conflict- this group are those referred to as conflict entrepreneurs and the economies they sustain called conflict entrepreneurship (Karbo and Nelson 2010:17).

However, there are several other levels of conflict entrepreneurs whether inside or outside the government. Conflict entrepreneurship funds violent conflicts through production, mobilization and allocation of resources to sustain the conflict. Conflict entrepreneurship feeds on illicit economic activities, extortion, control over strategic natural resources like oil, land, water, gold, diamond as well as piracy. Conflict entrepreneurship in Nigeria survives through different levels and layers of networks. It builds and sustains patronage systems. Cult related violence, herdsman-farmers crisis, electoral violence, illicit drug business, human trafficking and baby factory operations are some of the ways conflict entrepreneurship survives in Nigeria. Conflict is, therefore, a costly venture for Nigeria’s development.

Whereas we have established the concept of conflict entrepreneurship, it is also crucial to draw the nexus with conflict cost. Conflict cost refers to the consequences and outcomes of conflict to society and individuals inhabiting such society. Most times, this cost is classified into two, that is, human and material
costs. While Schmid (2000) claims that conflict cost is inconceivable since it is impossible to quantify it accurately, arguing that calculations of conflict cost are notoriously difficult to make and tend to be limited to direct material and human losses, Albert (2001) contends that “conflict cost” can be calculated by juxtaposing and comparing the post-conflict environment with the pre-conflict environment. Though we concede that the effects of human loss cannot be accurately quantified, we argue that human cost of conflict influences economic cost and undermines development since humans are the driving forces of development. Experts have argued that Europe’s economy collapsed by 70% after the Second World War due to the destructions of London, Germany and France (Notermens, 2000). It was estimated that rebuilding Europe cost the United States 50 billion dollars or 350-400 billion dollars today, yet, the economic benefits of having brand new technology and infrastructure is difficult to quantify. This is worsened by the 60-80 million casualties incurred in the six-year carnage.

Development is seen here in terms of human rights and human development. It is seen to imply human security. As the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) argued far back in 1994 that most of the concerns of people today relate to the insecurities that feature in their everyday lives. They claimed that “threats of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards” (UNDP, 1994:22), are factors induced or accommodated by individuals and systems that are undermining the development of human persons and consequently society. This article argues that the activities of conflict entrepreneurs cost the Nigerian society a huge sum in such a way that it generates grave consequences for the existence, training and livelihood of the human person. It also affects the freedom of the human person. As such, the concepts of conflict entrepreneurship, conflict cost and development
have great effect on Nigeria’s security landscape. Their connections raise the question of greed or the possibility of grievance.

**Conflict Entrepreneurship in Nigeria: Greed or Grievance?**

Greed is conceived as the selfish desire for or pursuit of money, wealth, power, food or other possessions, especially when this denies the same goods to others (see, Keen, 2012). It denotes the desire to acquire wealth or possession beyond the needs of the individual, especially when this accumulation or possession denies others’ legitimate needs or access to those needs or other resources. Such denial in Galtung’s conception of violence is an indirect form of violence. For example, amassing large wealth is not considered being greedy, unless in doing so the needs of others are jeopardized.

Whereas Frances Stewart, the key proponent of the horizontal inequalities’ explanation to conflicts claim that grievances resulting from historical injustices are the primary inducers of conflict (Stewart, 2000), the Paul Collier school argue that empirical evidence overwhelmingly point to the importance of economic agendas as opposed to grievance. Collier claims that ‘grievance-based explanations of civil war are ‘seriously wrong’ (2000:96). Collier and Hoeffler (2002) had elaborated on the greed versus grievance thesis giving economic motivations superiority over religious, ethnic or social grievances. David Keen (2012) argued that one of the reasons Collier’s perspective is taken seriously is that it is politically convenient. This is particularly true when the connections of elite greed and civil wars are viewed from the Eurocentric dimension which claims that such connections are applicable in the Global South and not in the countries of the North (Rao, 2012).

Earlier, Stathis Kalyvas in his classification of internal conflicts as ‘new wars’ characterised such conflicts essentially as “criminal, depoliticised, private and predatory”. He considered them to be motivated by ethnic politics, “private gain,
greed and loot” (Kalyvas, 2001:100-102). In this case, Kalyvas integrated the greed explanation with that of grievance. This is in line with Stewart’s claim that greed can be a significant factor in civil wars, but it often interacts with grievances in complex ways (Stewart and Fitzgerald, 2000).

Nevertheless, the economic motivations superiority argument tends to draw from the connections between natural resources and the likelihood of conflict thinking (Collier, 2007). This approach, has neglected the political and cultural factors like power and religion. Collier et al (2004) suggests that states that depend extensively on natural resources for capital generations were more prone to civil violence. This is collaborated by Chaturvedi (2005) who argued that natural resources (especially lootable resources) can provide finances to rebel groups and increase the prospects of their success and decrease prospects for peace, since continued conflict may be more profitable for rebels than an outbreak of peace. In contrast, however, Somalia, with homogenous ethnic configuration though of different clans, has no single natural resource.

Although when natural resources are concentrated in one area of a country, insurgent groups may be motivated by the assumption that seceding may be prosperous, the grievance argument cannot be discountenanced since historical relations of groups in a geographical space and memories of the past have the tendency to generate conflicts (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). In Nigeria, the economic explanation may have been responsible for the illegal bunkering and continued oil theft in the Delta region, crime and ritual killings in the East and West of the country, drug abuse and youth violence in the North West, the continued Boko Haram insurgency in the North East, recurring farmers/herders clashes and identity conflicts in the Middle Belt, persistent intra and inter party conflicts and the overwhelming presence of moneybags and Godfathers in Nigerian politics; they carry with them the grievance as well as the greed.
narratives. All these combine to form the mainstream analytical approach for understanding the high-level violence and insecurity in Nigeria.

Most times, these analyses are done neglecting the economic agenda of the promoters of conflict and violence – conflict entrepreneurs. While the 2.1 billion dollars Dasukigate arms deal saga generated controversy in Nigeria’s media (This Day 2015.), it forms part of what Collier and Hoeffler termed elite greed or taking conflict and cases of insecurity as a career. In other words, violent activities such as the Boko Haram insurgency are deliberate creations by some members of society either for economic or political gains. It is evident that there are people who cannot operate in an organised environment, rather, they initiate and live in crude environment where their illicit income is guaranteed. In this connection, like the Stewart group, we agree that grievance is a significant factor in most of the violent conflicts, but we argue that the greed perspective is more dominant since many are feeding fat on the combat economy.

Within developing economies like Nigeria, the legitimacy of the government is much weaker as regimes are narrowly based, come to power by manipulating votes and remain in power by extending the largesse to their prebends. ¹ Recently, an observer argued that weak states are most likely to be invaded by predators who cash on the weakness and the ravaging conflicts to exploit the state (Ihembe, 2017). Under such conditions, conflict entrepreneurs are most likely to create a situation where they seek outside support to foster the crisis and sustain their business. This we have seen with the internationalisation of Boko Haram (Comolli, 2015) and the network with other international armed and terrorist

¹ Prebends from prebendalism is a term advanced by Richard Joseph (1991) to describe the patronage system and high-level corruption in Nigeria.
groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levante (ISIL). Nigerian government have recently negotiated with Boko Haram for the release of some members of the Chibok school girls who were kidnapped by the terrorist group in 2014 expectedly at a huge cost. The government also commissioned a committee with the mandate to rebuild the north east that was destroyed by the Boko Haram insurgents. The rebuilding is estimated at over a hundred billion naira (Leadership, 2016). In the Delta region, the cost of vandalization of pipelines and illegal bunkering have been enormous and contributed to weakening Nigeria’s economy.

These security challenges have unfolded enormous destructive and money-absorbing potentials. Yet, this period of insecurity has shown quite antagonistic economic dimension. This is because the on-going insecurity in the country forms the basis for a newly evolving economic system which has turned the challenges into a source of wealth for certain people. Thus, making Keen’s (1998:11) assertion that insecurity (war) has become a “continuation of economics by other means” extremely obtainable in Nigeria. Parallel to the human and economic cost of the insecurity in Nigeria, highly profitable economic structures have evolved in the shadow of the challenges (Jurgen Endres, 2003). Consequently, conflict entrepreneurs have developed economic strategies that enabled rebel groups, fighting factions, arms racketeers and conflict initiators not only to cover their direct costs of engaging in conflict, but also to gain enormous financial profits from national resources.

Conflict entrepreneurs or protagonists of violence in Nigeria have created conditions for their economic activities by engaging in conflict situations which manifest excessive greed and lust for power. It is clear from the discourse of war (violent) economies that the gradual breakdown of institutionalised security can be turned into a lucrative source of income for conflict entrepreneurs (Endres,
2003:121). Nigerian experience is not an exception to this discourse. In the last couple of years security has received a large chunk of the country’s budgetary allocation. This was an attempt to reduce the level of insecurity in Nigeria. However, rather than addressing the challenge, the issues have proliferated and snowballed in an unprecedented manner, with the same security budget looted by the elite.

Whereas the Boko Haram insurgency as well as some other agitations and conflicts in Nigeria are sustained by the greed thesis, some of them emerged from grievance explanation but were hijacked by the elite. For Boko Haram, it was seen as one of the grassroots responses to bad governance in Nigeria that was particularly produced by the abandoned sharia project of northern Nigerian Governors (Albert, 2011). As such, members of the Boko Haram sect led by Mohammed Yusuf were said to have been frustrated by the abandoned project after the political elite reaped its political dividends. The group subsequently mobilised against the political authorities. Nevertheless, grievance metamorphosed into greed not just for the members of the sect but for certain shadow parties believed to be among the political elite.

**The Political Economy of Violence in Nigeria: Beyond Greed and Grievance**

Conflicts in Nigeria have long manifested in many forms and for various reasons over the “distribution of wealth, power sharing, inability of the state to provide the needed public goods and protect its citizens, arbitrary and solitary exercise of power, mismanagement of state resources, abuse of power and the collapse of economic and social structures and institutions” (Ochogwu, 2010:36). These issues have been exploited by conflict entrepreneurs who see violence as business. They have made their fellow countrymen vulnerable to their predatory activities. Conflict entrepreneurship stems most times from greed and some other times from grievance. Nevertheless, the underlying factor is the financial gain
from conflict entrepreneurship. This draws attention to the political economy of violence paradigm which assumes that people engage in violence for economic reasons.

Considering the origin of the concept of political economy in the liberal stream of thinking, the very subtitle of political economy of violence is a contradiction. This follows the fact that Immanuel Kant had over two hundred years ago identified “commerce” as a potential force to pacify the relations among states. Kant reiterated the intrinsic logic of commercial relations that foster peace and probably render the means of force dysfunctional. This is understandable in the sense that economy means the production, distribution and consumption of relevant material resources by the means of violence-free competition through market forces (Dietrich Jung, 2003:10). Moreover, there is a strong connection between the pacifying potential of trade, which does not unfold automatically and specific political structures. This implies that there is a strong link between politics and economics. Karl Marx in his Critique of Political Economy attempted a demystification of a capitalist market exchange that is free of force. He identified the disguised power relations behind the formally equal competitors of the market. Marx drew attention to the factual inequality of capitalist market relations in which asymmetric and exploitative power relations prevail, guaranteed by the legal and coercive apparatus of the modern state (Jung, 2003). His position revealed the role of physical force behind the establishment of liberal market relations. Similarly, competitors and entrepreneurs have often devised and engaged several violent means to gain advantage of the economy. Their continued existence and survival rests on the oars of continued violent economy.

Cursory inspection of the prevalence of violent economy in Nigeria will show that the nation has progressively become dominated by warlord-type politics.
Warlord politics is resource and economic driven. Some other times, the goal is to capture reins of power by establishing clientelist relationships and patronage systems or by brokering deals with local strongmen who exercised power in their own rights (Reno, 2000). Whereas the activities of the actors of warlord-type politics in Nigeria manifests the tendencies of specifically greed and at other times grievance, much of the literature tend to neglect the role of the state as an actor and institution in generating or prolonging violence. This approach of neglecting “state behaviour may in fact legitimise repressive and corrupt state elite who may in turn profit from the violent economy at the expense of the population” (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005).

Although in the recent history of Nigeria many individuals – in this case conflict entrepreneurs – pretend that they are public spirited individuals fighting against some form of injustice, unfairness, marginalisation or exclusion but in the real sense are people who feel they will not do well without a situation of conflict as Collier and the greed school often claims, the state is often culpable since it creates the environment for such venture. For instance, in 2013 after a faceoff between then President Goodluck Jonathan and Governor Rotimi Chibuike Amaechi of Rivers State, some actors cashed in on the faceoff and demonstrated their interests in the escalation and sustenance of the conflict possibly for political reasons (The Will, 2013). At a point, the media described such actors as ‘tough and undiplomatic people with a thug minded determination and a deep pocket that thrives in a policy of vindictiveness’. Some of the actors have since reaped the political and economic benefits while violence in Rivers State has almost become a culture in the sense that both the loyalists of past and present government in Rivers state appear to maintain their relevance through violence. Recently, state actors have attempted to repress agitations from a section of the country resulting from years of injustices and inequalities. The group under the
umbrella of the Independent Peoples of Biafra (IPOB) were even proscribed as a terrorist organisation, although in a manner considered controversial by keen observers. Amnesty International had earlier accused the Nigerian Military of human right violation against IPOB members as the military attacked these unarmed peaceful demonstrators leading to huge fatalities. The same military whose constitutional duty is to protect the state, acting on behalf of the state, militarised almost the entire geographical space of the Nigerian state, generating fear and obstructing freedom. The militarised condition is probably induced by the idea that the state has monopoly of violence. Consequently, private actors – herdsmen – have exploited this condition in states such as Benue, Plateau, Nassarawa, Adamawa, Taraba, and Kaduna with the managers of state almost unwilling to protect the population. This is given credence to by a letter from former President Olusegun Obasanjo to sitting President Mohammadu Buhari, accusing him of turning a blind eye to the violence (Punch, 2018). What is important here is that the state sometimes releases large chunk of funds into violent economies which enables it to thrive (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005). Besides, Tilly (1985) and Ake (1996) remind us that the character of the state itself is a conflict generating apparatus. The state that should protect the population by providing an environment of freedom has been captured and manipulated by greedy elite that perpetuate violence for the purposes of profit making. Whereas the state is complicit to this violent and criminal enterprise, it remains the only counter force that could address this criminality and drive processes of human security. This is because, as Shinoda (2004) argues, the state is reposed with legitimacy as well as monopoly of coercive force to compel criminal minded elements into obeying her to guarantee security.
Conclusion
This article examined how political and economic factors influence violent conflicts in Nigeria and concluded that the prevalence of violence in Nigeria serves a sphere of the population who are strategically positioned to reap from illegalities. The article showed that violence is a business for some. While scholarly preoccupations with the conflict entrepreneurship phenomenon in Nigeria tend to focus on how greed facilitated several violent conflicts (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), and at other times engaging with grievances as the causation factor for violent conflicts and crimes (Albert, 2011), only few studies have integrated the greed and grievance showing how they are intertwined and reinforce each other (Benedikt Korf, 2005; Ikelegbe, 2005). Thus, apart from building on the greed and grievance nexus, this article anchored on the political economy approach interrogated the cost of conflict entrepreneurship for development in Nigeria.

We show that the political economy of violence produces a self-sustaining logic of clientelism along “we versus them” lines and deepens warlord-like politics. This form of clientelism nourishes grievances along the same “we versus them”, generating a cult-like group which stimulates violence and reaps from the violent generated and sustained economy. We showed that beyond the greed versus grievance thesis put forward as explanation to the behaviour of few individuals – a group we classified as conflict entrepreneurs – the state itself plays critical roles in generating violence and providing the environment that sustains violent economies. In addition, we argued that state failure induced unemployment constitutes part of the violent narrative and conditions for enabling conflict entrepreneurship to thrive. We argue that the structure of politics and economics in Nigeria should have peace-building mainstreamed into the fabric of national life as a way of stimulating good governance and delivery of the common good.
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